

Statement of BM1 David M. Chapman II

To whom it may concern:

To the best of memory. Concerning the events on 19th September 2005 in regards to the mishap of the Sydney mae II. I (Bm1 Chapman) had the senior duty Officer; I restricted the Umpqua River bar about 16:00 because the bar was 14-16ft. sluffing breaks in all areas. BMC Halstead and I passed another bar report about 18:15 the bar was the same. About 19:45 BMC Halstead and myself went and looked at the bar for last light bar report it was still doing 14-16 sluffing breaks in all areas. The Station talked with the Sydney mae II on passing the bar report to them and told them that Coos Bay bar was open to cross. The Sydney mae II agreed to head south about 19:50. About 19:55 the charter boat captain of Fish on charter. Came to the station and argued with BMC Halstead and myself about how the bar was lying down and the Sydney mae II could cross. BMC Halstead and I told him that the restriction would stay in affect because it was to dark to see the bar anymore and to dangerous to go and look at it on the boat. The CAPT. of Fish on charters left the Station about 20:10. The Station then received a call from Sully Guide service that he sees a strobe light south of the south jetty. 20:42 the Station tried to contact the Sydney mae II on channel 16A and 22A no contact was made. The Station launched MLB 47229 with 5 people on board. To see if we could locate the Sydney mae II. The MLB 47229 also had Sector North Bend launch a helo. At 21:05 we arrived on scene with no POB at position 43 39.26N 124 13.06W. We then launched a flare and BMC Halstead noticed a reflection of the port bow and proceeded towards it and as we were approaching we heard someone yelling help continuously. We pulled up along side and brought them onboard and administered first aid for hypothermia and shock we asked how many people were onboard we were told 6 people. We then asked again and the answer was 4 people. We then started checking the wreckage for the other people. Passed descriptions of the people and clothing they were wearing to Station and Sector. Visibility was dropping and we could not see more then 5-10 yards all around the boat. We then proceeded to #2 buoy and watched for breakers on the bar using radar. The survivors were in stable condition so we stayed in position and waited for bar conditions to improve before crossing.


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ORIGINAL

